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New research in neuroeconomics suggests that money may 
a more powe I motivator than previously thought, 
UJith important implications for incentive pay programs. 
ince the fall of 2008, few individ-
uals have been as vilified as 
senior employees in the disinte-
grating worldwide financial 
services sector. Executives at 
organizations such as Citigroup, 
or American International Group 
(AIG) in the United States, 
Bradford and Bingley in England, 
Fortis in Belgium or Glitner Bank 
in Iceland have all been forced to 
seek government assistance as 
their operations failed in the 
midst of an unprecedented inter-
national financial crisis. 
However, even as these bail-
outs were taking place, incentives that had been 
previously negotiated were being paid out. This 
resulted in an enormous backlash from the 
media, scholars, politicians and citizens who 
failed to see how the individuals within these 
organizations should continue to reap the 
rewards of previously negotiated incentive plans 
in the face of dismal organizational performance. 
Although pay-for-performance systems have 
been seen as effective methods of linking indi-
vidual performance and rewards, the current 
crisis has revealed that the problems associated 
with the design of such systems may not be as 
clear cut as previously thought. 
Pay-for-performance systems are fremlf~ntlv 
used by companies in an effort to link c 
sation to improved employee performance. In 
fact, a recent study by Hewitt suggested that 77% 
of all U.S. companies utilize at least one pay-for-
performance plan within their compensation 
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systems.! Although now a well-established set of 
tools in the arsenal of compensation design pro-
fessionals, these plans vary significantly depend-
ing on the context in which they are being 
deployed. 
Consideration is usually given to the organi-
zation's environment, the competitiveness of 
the market in which it does business, environ-
mental munificence (the degree to which 
resources are abundant or scarce), environmen-
tal turbulence and uncertainty, industry, size, 
age, product life cycle, culture, degree of union-
ization, nature of the work performed and 
region.2 Yet for all of the consideration given to 
the design, there are serious flaws that continue 
to exist in pay-for-performance systems. 
The frequently unanticipated problem with 
many pay-for-performance systems is that they 
may be more effective than anticipated by their 
designers. In today's cash-focused culture, where 
new research suggests that money may have 
similar influences on individual actions as drugs 
or sex, the unexpected impact of plans that 
reward certain behaviors with cash is perhaps 
more than first thought. Because money has 
been shown to act as both an incentive when 
people understand that a particular action leads to 
obtaining money and as a reinforcer ofthe actions 
that led in the past to acquiring money,3 it is 
uniquely positioned to affect behavior in ways 
perhaps unanticipated by most practitioners. 
In this article, we revisit the pay-for-performance 
debate, with a focus on individual incentives, 
especially as it has attracted so much attention in 
the current economic mess. The focus is on indi-
vidual incentives because many of the criticisms 
do not apply to some group and organizational 
plans, such as gain sharing and profit sharing. In 
the next section, the article provides an overview 
of the traditional arguments for and against pay-
for -performance systems. It then discusses a new 
perspective on the use of money to motivate 
behavior. Finally, it discusses lessons and impli-
cations for managers. 
Arguments Supporting Individual Plans 
Proponents of individual incentive programs 
typically point to the tremendous growth in the 
use of such plans in compensation design as evi-
dence of the positive impact incentive pay can 
have on organizational performance (see Exhibit 
1 for some data on the trend). As a result of the 
EXHIBIT 1 
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widely held belief that such plans offer signifi-
cant opportunities for improved employee per-
formance, incentives have become a larger 
portion of total executive pay and have become 
increasingly part of the compensation design in a 
wider range of employee levels and categories. 
In turn, an entire field of compensation con-
sulting practices have sprung up to aid organi-
zations in developing elaborate incentive plans 
that strategically link to human resource man-
agement systems with the goal of improving the 
overall performance. In addition to simply point-
ing to the prevalence of such systems, supporters 
typically offer four key arguments in support of 
the use of incentive based pay. 
The first, which is based on expectancy theory, 
suggests that employees will be motivated to 
work harder to achieve greater financial rewards. 
According to this argument, incentive plans typi-
cally link improved levels of employee outputs 
(e.g., sales, service, widget production) to an 
increase in pay. Incentives based on the achieve-
ment of goals that are achievable and imple-
mented in a culture of trust drive behaviors 
required by the organization. 
Second, they suggest that incentive plans can 
be effectively utilized to align the actions of indi-
vidual employees with the goals of the organiza-
tion. In most complex organizations, employees 
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are called on to perform a wide variety of tasks. 
However, as a result of the increasing complexity 
of work, these employees may have a fair amount 
of latitude in the manner, order and timing of 
such tasks. 
In addition to making decisions regarding 
the ordering of work, they may also be able to 
decide to apply or not to apply discretionary 
effort to subtly affect their output beyond the 
minimal expectations of the role. This argument 
suggests that by incenting certain behaviors, 
employees are more likely to differentiate their 
efforts to focus on certain activities over others in 
expectation of rewards. 
Employers who track employee engagement 
or other similar satisfaction levels within their 
organizations often carefully monitor their staff's 
perception of the fairness of the organizations' 
policies and practices. Such organizations have 
often gone on to draw links between their posi-
tive employee engagement scores and decreased 
employee turnover, improved customer satisfaction 
and even increased financial performance. These 
employers believe that it is important for their 
employees to perceive that they are fair in their 
practices, including those related to compensa-
tion. Thus, from an equity perspective, pay-for-
performance plans enhance employees' perceptions 
of fairness by providing greater rewards to those 
employees who have expended greater efforts. 
Furthermore, reinforcement theory posits that 
employees will continue to exhibit certain posi-
tive behaviors when they are rewarded for doing 
so. Incentive plans that continue to reward cer-
tain behaviors consistently over time eventually 
hard wire certain activities or performance levels 
into the day-to-day actions of employees. 
Finally, there is a large body of empirical 
research that suggests that individual incentives 
and other pay-for-performance plans contribute 
to increased employee productivity and organi-
zational performance.4 
Arguments Against the Plans 
There is also a large body of literature on the 
problems associated with the use of pay-for-perf or-
mance plans. Yet given the popularity of such sys-
tems, it is useful to remind practitioners about 
some of the potential perils. 
First, to reward individual performance, man-
agers must have an effective method to measure 
such performance, if it can be measured at all. 
However, in most jobs, individual contributions 
are difficult to identify and/or performance is 
difficult to objectively measure. As a result, highly 
subjective ratings, especially those of supervi-
sors, may be used instead of more measurable or 
objective ones. 
Second, not only are pay-for-performance 
systems difficult to measure, but also they may 
actually decrease an employee's natural willing-
ness to work. Rather than contributing to the 
success of their team or the organization itself 
because of the inherent motivation of the activi-
ties involved in the work itself, employees may 
become oriented to only working toward actions 
that are associated with rewards. In addition to 
the potential negative impact on intrinsic moti-
vation, such activities may also decrease group 
cohesion as employees compete for limited 
resources or question the return of actions that 
seem purely social in nature. 
Third, even when methods are in place to mea-
sure individual performance, managers are often 
extremely reluctant to rate their employees differ-
ently. They fear that the employees in their group 
may be less willing to work as a team, may volunteer 
for additional work less frequently or may simply 
interact less positively with the manager. Further 
complicating this issue is the fact that in difficult 
economic times compensation budgets may be 
decreased or even cut midperiod, resulting in unan-
ticipated changes or eliminations of plans and an 
overall distrust by all of those involved in participa-
tion or administration of the systems. 
Fourth, an important factor in the acceptance 
of a pay-for-performance system is the employees' 
perception of the fairness of the system. In gen-
eral, employees will accept only plans that clearly 
communicate the rewards associated with the 
efforts and where the employees do not antici-
pate that the employer will reduce payouts should 
they exceed the plans' expectations. Employees 
need to trust management and believe that they 
can achieve the goals set for them. Managers in 
turn need to set fair yet challenging goals to sub-
stantiate the cost of pay-for-performance plans. 
The effectiveness of any pay-for-performance 
system rests in its ability to adequately motivate 
an employee to behave in the manner in which 
the system was designed to reinforce. In the end, 
the underpinning of any pay-for-performance 
system is the establishment of an accepted 
method of performance evaluation-one that 
is fair and transparent. However, methods of 
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There is value in thel'eplans evid~ntin theirincteasing 
organizational use 
evaluation are often fraught with significant 
problems. 
Acceptance of feedback may be affected both 
by individual employee differences and by orga-
nizational or contextual variables. Some of the 
potential individual differences include the 
employees' self-esteem level, whether they 
exhibit an internal or external locus of control 
and their overall feedback orientation, whereas a 
key contextual or organizational factor is the per-
ceived level offairness in the process.s 
Finally, another hindrance to the effectiveness 
of pay-for-performance systems is found in the 
nature of the behaviors that are chosen by organiza-
tions to be rewarded. Often, pay-for-performance 
systems become encumbered by complex, multi-
layered formulae that attempt to reward such a 
large number of behaviors that the employees are 
unable to keep their priorities straight. 
Other poorly thought out systems result in 
designs that actually reward behaviors other than 
what the program was designed to incent. This 
can be especially true when an employee's efforts 
at optimizing one objective results in decreasing 
returns on other objectives. Furthermore, inter-
ventions that use money to bolster motivation 
also presume that performance is under the con-
trol of the people who get the incentives, when 
the actual work environment may require a high 
degree of cross-functional activity or where the 
performance of the employees or the organiza-
tion itself is highly influenced by external com-
petitive forces.6 
The above issues have been discussed in the 
extant literature, and the debate has been 
ongoing (see Exhibit 2 for a summary of the 
arguments for and against). However, research 
in the area of neuroeconomics adds a new 
dimension to the discussion. 
Physiological Effects of Money 
This literature suggests that humans may 
actually be physiologically hardwired to react to 
money, adding considerable weight to existing 
concerns that such plans may actually work too 
well within an organization. Because of this, 
employees may be motivated to excessively focus 
on doing what they need to do to gain the reward 
at the expense of doing things to help the 
organization,7 or they may even be further tempted 
to manipulate systems by inflating measures or 
indulging in gaming practices.s 
Neuroeconomics is a combination of neuro-
science, economics and psychology that attempts 
to explain how both rational and irrational deci-
sion making occurs in the brain.9 As part of this 
research, neuroeconomists have used new scien-
tific techniques to illustrate the real-world appli-
cation of traditional theory with their current 
research focused on the impact of certain stimuli 
on the brain. 
Through the use of magnetic resonance imag-
ing, neuroscientists are able to map brain activity 
to show electrical activity when neurons fire and 
discharge such chemicals as dopamine. The most 
recent research in this field has attempted to 
map exactly how the brain will react to certain 
stimuli. 
This research has shown that significant activ-
ity took place in the nucleus accumbens when 
participants were in the presence of money and 
immediate monetary incentives were shown to 
be associated with immediate versus delayed 
rewards. This rather unexpected result surprised 
researchers. Unlike traditional views of money 
that suggest it is only a tool to obtain goods and 
services, this new finding suggests that money 
may in fact be a motivator unto itself. 
The nucleus accumbens is part of the bridge 
that connects the two sides of the brain; it is part 
of the limbic system that controls emotions such 
as hope, euphoria, addiction, fury, fear, lust, sexual 
arousal and aggression and is activated in situa-
tions that involve reward and punishment. Using 
magnetic resonance techniques, scientists have 
found that monetary gain stimulates the same 
reward circuitry as cocaine-in both cases dop-
amine is released into the nucleus accumbens. 
In contrast, and perhaps equally as important 
in terms of pay-for-performance design, a threat 
of financial loss can result in employees demon-
strating the classical fight-or-flight reactions such 
as an elevated heart rate, an increase in blood 
pressure or an elevated level of alertness, more 
typically associated with physical attacks and 
threatened harm. When anticipated gains are not 
realized, dopamine levels decrease, resulting in 
negative physical reactions to the loss of income. 
Researchers have further demonstrated that 
automatic emotional responses such as fear and 
greed often trump more controlled or higher level 
brain responses, bringing into question the notion 
that employees react to pay-for-performance 
plans in a rational manner. Given that these reac-
tions are hardwired into human physiology, it 
seems unlikely that individuals will be able to 
overcome these natural reactions to the stimulus 
of money by way of intellect alone. 
Although most of the current theories rely on 
the notion that man makes rational decisions, 
this research suggests that humans struggle 
between reacting to the emotions that cause 
them to crave rewards and a wish to demonstrate 
rational thought and decision making when faced 
with competing alternatives. 
Implications for Managers 
Although other researchers have identified 
that strong links between pay and performance 
can exacerbate problems having to do with risk 
aversion, decrease in intrinsic motivation and so 
on, this new research adds to the concern that 
employees in pay-for-performance situations 
can be tempted to manipulate such systems by 
inflating measures, indulging in gaming practices 
or demonstrating unethical or even illegal 
behaviors as a reaction to certain financial 
incentive structures. lO 
Agency theory has significantly affected com-
pensation design models. It suggests that a prin-
cipal, or an owner or employer, contracts with an 
agent or manager to perform certain behaviors 
that will result in outcomes to meet the princi-
pal's goals. In an attempt to persuade the agents 
to exert their best efforts, principals agree to 
incentive programs to ensure that the agents or 
managers (and employees) act in the organiza-
tion's best interests. These models further suggest 
that the interests of the principal and the agent 
are further aligned through the process of moni-
toring to ensure that expected performance is 
achieved and to reduce the chance of the agent to 
act opportunistically. II 
Agency theory suggests that employees are 
likely to take advantage of situations where there 
is inadequate monitoring of the work performed 
or where the incentive program design does not 
properly align the rewards to the expected out-
comes. Without these checks and balances, it 
becomes more likely that employees will engage 
in illegal behaviors. 
However, in the context of the neuroeco-
nomic research discussed, it would appear that 
employers who choose to make use of pay-for-
performance systems need to be even more 
vigilant against their unintended consequences 
than even this theory suggests. Organizations 
would also have to decide whether the actions 
required to effectively monitor employees who 
are motivated to engage in illegal behavior may 
significantly outweigh any benefits that pay-for-
performance systems may otherwise bring to the 
organization. 
That such serious design flaws exist in incen-
tive plans should come as no surprise to scholars 
of white-collar crime. Blatant manipulation of 
circumstances to gain wealth or power seems 
hardly surprising given the Enron scandal or the 
recent Ponzi schemes of Bernard Madoff. 
Legal and illegal activities to manipulate short-
term results have been used by those involved to 
ensure that they earn high, and sometimes outra-
geous, levels of compensation. Given what we 
now know about the physiological reaction dis-
played by humans at the thought of the acquisi-
tion of wealth, perhaps the more significant 
question for practitioners is why such things do 
not happen more often. 
For organizations that continue to implement 
pay-for-performance plans, serious consideration 
should be given to the design of such programs 
to ameliorate the issues associated with using 
money as a reward. Designers of these plans 
should anticipate that any pay scheme that has 
sufficient worth to have a positive impact on per-
formance is likely to incent at least a portion of 
the organization's population to consider how 
they might outwit the program design.12 
Consequently, plan design should involve 
those with sufficient knowledge of the processes 
and practices to anticipate how less than scrupu-
lous employees might work the program in their 
favor. Unfortunately, those typically involved in 
such design-consultants or management-may 
lack sufficient hands-on knowledge to do so 
effectively and thus should solicit appropriate 
feedback during the design phase. 
Plan designs should also focus on longer term 
results rather than items that can be manipulated in 
the short term to produce the stated objectives. In 
particular, pay-for-performance programs should 
avoid paying out for results that can be better 
attributed to external factors, such as an overall 
gain in the market, than the efforts of the plan 
participants. 
In addition to the measurement of items with a 
longer term focus, consideration should be given to 
including claw backs or forfeiture of future rewards 
should payments be made in the short term that 
later are determined to be based only on manipulation 
of certain factors within the control of the partici-
pant at the expense of more important organiza-
tional goals. Furthermore, serious public sanctions 
should be established against those who have bla-
tantly gamed the system. 
Incentive plans should also be deigned to include 
a real downside risk if organizational results are not 
achieved. For example, plans that require that the 
participants hold a minimum level of equity, some 
through purchases, for a period of time-possibly 
including a period beyond their tenure-would 
help to ensure that employees in these firms focus 
beyond their own short-term interests. 
Those in positions of governance of such 
plans should take a more active role in the moni-
toring to ensure that the goals of the program 
actually manifest themselves in the manner 
anticipated. Plan design should anticipate the 
time required for regular monitoring and 
adjustment by management, so that this important 
part of the process is not avoided by those who 
may prefer to shun evaluation of staff. 
Governance committees will need to ensure that 
sufficient transparency and communication exist 
to counteract the natural temptation of investors, 
who may know relatively little about the business, to 
focus on single, easy-to-understand metrics such as 
quarterly profits and share prices, which offer more 
opportunity for internal manipulation. External 
and internal communication of plan design should 
focus on providing clear information and links 
among the goals of the compensation design and 
results. Rather than rubber-stamping extravagant 
compensation plans presented to them by man-
agement, boards of directors need to be held 
accountable for the success or failure of the com-
pensation systems they endorse. 
Because boards themselves can be accused of 
being systemically biased as a result of their 
inherent relationships and structure, some orga-
nizations may benefit from the solicitation of 
feedback on plan design from those who may be 
considered more neutral evaluators, such as 
institutional investors or those who support "say-
on-pay" initiatives. In the end, boards themselves 
may need to be better constructed so that their 
members are more knowledgeable about the 
workings of the industry in which the company 
operates and can therefore offer more to the pro-
cess of design than tacit approval of the recom-
mendations of management or consultants. 
Finally, organizations should not depend on 
incentives or pay-for-performance plans as a sole 
or even the most potent motivator of desired 
employee behavior. Ideally, these systems should 
complement other, and perhaps more important, 
facets of organizational life, including well-
designed jobs and workplaces, employee auton-
omy and involvement in their work, effective 
leadership and fair and just work systems. If an 
organization solely depends on incentives for 
employee motivation, it may be in more trouble 
than it realizes. 
Conclusions 
Pay may be far more significant a motivator 
than ever indicated by prior research on motiva-
tional theory. In fact, contrary to earlier beliefs, 
evidence suggests that pay is capable of fulfilling 
higher order needs as well as lower order needs 
such as food, security, social relations, esteem 
and even self-actualization needs.13 Researchers 
in the fields of sociology and social psychology 
have further expanded our understanding of the 
role of money as a marker of social status and an 
indicator of the possessor's general wealth, quan-
tity of possessions and consumption.I4 
The recent economic downturn has illustrated 
the powerful potential impact of a loss of such 
status on even those who seem logically insu-
lated by their wealth. An example of this was the 
suicide of German billionaire Adolf Merckle. His 
death was attributed to shame rather than its 
impact on his livelihood as he remained an 
extraordinarily wealthy person even after his 
companies suffered heavy losses.I5 
Evidence of the increasingly complicated role 
money plays in society is now being demonstrated 
by researchers in the neuroeconomics field. The 
findings that individual reactions to programs 
designed to motivate certain behaviors may be far 
less rational than previously considered and that 
reactions to monetary gains could be more similar 
to reactions to sex or drugs have critical implica-
tions for organizations that depend on pay-for-
performance methods to incent the actions of 
their employees. The bottom line is that money 
may be an even more potent motivator than we 
thought; thus, compensation professionals must 
use incentives with much more care. 
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